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Abstract
Clive Bell coined the phrase significant form. The way he initially defined 
the phrase and the way he implemented it were two different matters. In 
this article Bell's procedure is analysed as a characteristic o f  late moder­
nist aesthetics, i.e. an attempt to come to terms with the challenge o f  the 
radically new in art. It is suggested that one should bear in mind that 
formalism in this sense is a theory o f  artistic material which explains how 
meaning is communicated and perceived through non-discursive qualities 
o f the artistic material. That is the relevance o f  Susanne K. Longer's re- 
interpretation o f  Bell's phrase.
1. Introduction
Clive Bell’s aesthetics does not make for profound reading. Why bother then? 
The least one can say is that Bell contributed towards the modem aesthetic 
vocabulary by coining a phrase that has since become a cliché or hackneyed for 
that matter, viz. significant form . On the other hand, if one reflects from a 
distance on the Wirkungsgeschichte o f Bell’s phrase as well as on the Wirkungs- 
geschichte o f the problem he wanted to solve, significant form  has an intriguing 
logic. Significant form  as an aesthetic category has spawned quite a generation 
of related concepts, from Clive Bell to Susanne K. Langer’s unconsummated 
symbol, up to Nelson Goodman’s languages o f art (Goodman, 1976), Peter
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Kivy’s physiognomy o f musical expression (Kivy, 1980) and perhaps Arthur C. 
Danto’s transfiguration o f  the commonplace (Danto, 1981), as well as David 
Summers’ conceptual image (Bryson et al., 1991:231-259). It has distant 
relationships with Alois Riegl’s Kunstwollen and Julius von Schlosser’s Kunst- 
sprache. As such one is justified to say that significant fo rm  constitutes one 
episode in the narrative o f the history of art as an autonomous and intellectual 
discipline, i.e. to explain the development o f art forms and styles not with refe­
rence to the biographies o f artists, but in terms o f concepts related to the arts 
themselves. A further merit o f the notion o f significant form  is that it creates an 
apparatus for analysing and explaining the reception o f  works o f art, especially 
when new works o f art tend to upset well-established patterns o f aesthetic 
behaviour.
Perhaps that is crediting Bell for too much, for he did not talk o f ‘reception of 
works of art’ but o f ‘appreciating art’. Neither did he refer to ‘upsetting well 
established patterns o f aesthetic behaviour’, but rather to something akin to unre­
cognized reappearances of past great moments o f the history o f art. But that is 
the sense I propose to make o f his 1914 book, simply titled Art, otherwise 
described by himself in a 1949 foreword as full o f "exaggerations, childish 
simplifications and injustices" (1987:xv). My approach entails that I shall do 
some close reading o f Bell’s Art, but with the wisdom o f historical hindsight. I 
am very much interested in the loose strands o f his argument, as I propose to read 
them as indications of unsolved modernist issues. Without attempting a problem- 
geschichtliche genealogy of the notion o f significant fo rm , 1 want to argue that 
Susanne K. Langer’s interpretation and reworking o f  Bell’s phrase contributes 
significantly to formalism as a tenable aesthetic theory.
2. Bell’s significant form
What does Bell’s phrase significant fo rm  entail? I quote Bell’s now famous 
description at length:
For either all works o f visual art have some common quality, or when we 
speak o f ‘works o f art’ we gibber. Everyone speaks o f ‘art’, making a 
mental classification by which he distinguishes the class ‘works o f art’ from 
all other classes. What is the justification o f this classification? What is the 
quality common and peculiar to all members o f this class? Whatever it be, 
no doubt it is often found in company with other qualities; but they are 
adventitious -  it is essential. There must be some one quality without 
which a work o f art cannot exist; possessing which, in the least degree, no 
work is altogether worthless. What is this quality? W hat quality is shared 
by all objects that provoke our aesthetic emotions? What quality is 
common to Sta Sophia and the windows at Chartres, Mexican sculpture, a 
Persian bowl, Chinese caipets, G iotto’s frescoes at Padua, and the mas-
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terpieces o f  Poussin, Piero della Francesca, and Cézanne? O nly one answ er 
seems possible -  significant form . In each lines and colours com bined in a 
particular way, certain form s and relations o f  form s stir our aesthetic 
em otions. These relations and com binations o f  lines and colours, these 
aesthetically  m oving form s, I call ‘Significant form  and ‘Significant form  ’ 
is the one quality  com m on to all works o f  visual art (Bell, 1987:7-8).
In an apparently inductive approach Bell comes to the conclusion that what really 
matters in at least the visual arts are the combination and relation o f formal 
elements in such a way that they affect the observer in a specific -  aesthetic -  
way. If  we attend closely to the matter o f formal elements, and read it as Bell’s 
answer to a lamentable cultural situation, his apparently inductive reasoning 
sounds convincing. What Bell is reacting against, as is well known, is the way in 
which art, especially paintings and sculpture, has become consumed in his time. 
There was "an excessive concern with subject matter" (Dickie, 1955:143): 
fashionable paintings and sculpture in England at the turn o f the century were 
always ‘about’ something, and the skills o f the artist and his use o f materials were 
secondary to the portrayal of a subject, to a certain extent taken for granted. One 
can speak o f the demands of an art market which set an index for works o f  art as 
commodity articles which favoured themes, topics and subjects. One can list the 
art o f W.P. Frith (1819-1909), Sir L. Alma-Tadema (1836-1912) and Sir L. Filde 
(1844-1927), all referred to by Bell and classified (and disqualified) as ‘Descrip­
tive Painting’ (Bell, 1987:16), as paradigm cases in this regard.
Against this background Bell’s stress on the formal elements o f  a work o f art 
makes sense. His argument focuses on the specifically artistic qualities o f  a work 
o f art: the exploration o f the possibilities o f the artistic medium, a heightened 
sensitivity for the so-called technical aspects o f a work o f  art, the strikingness o f 
a work o f  art irrespective o f its subject (a painting about a humdrum subject can 
be very striking whereas the humdrum subject in itself is not). Bell (1987:27) 
states it pointblank:
To appreciate a work o f  art we need bring w ith us noth ing but a sense o f  
form  and colour and a know ledge o f  three-dim ensional space. T hat bit o f  
know ledge, I adm it, is essential to the appreciation o f  m any great works, 
since m any o f  the m ost m oving form s ever created  are in three  dim ensions.
To put it in more recent terminology: somehow a work o f  visual art refers back 
to itself -  the ‘artiness’ o f a work o f art fascinates us, and not so much its subject. 
If we have to choose between Cézanne’s rendition o f  apples and that o f  the art 
school’s novice, we -  according to Bell -  will always choose Cézanne, because 
Cézanne’s painting is more significant than that o f  the art school’s novice. With 
that Bell underscores the aesthetically significant.
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That seems to make sense. We should, however, bear in mind the shift in focus 
underlying this argument. What Bell says about art, is one thing; what he does 
about it, another. With ‘significant form’ Bell does not merely define the essence 
of art, but also implies a distinction between ‘significant art’ and ‘insignificant 
art’ -  a distinction which is argued at great length. Bell is not really speaking of 
‘all art’ as his argument apparently states. A closer inspection o f  his store room 
for works o f art bears this out: the inclusion o f crafts ("a Persian bowl, Chinese 
carpets") in the class o f ‘high’ works o f art such as the "masterpieces o f Poussin, 
Piero della Francesca, and Cézanne", as well as the cross-cultural collection of 
artistic objects appears to be very ecumenical, but is in fact a careful selection to 
witness to the ‘fact’ o f ‘significant form’. What Bell omits is very telling. The 
art of the Renaissance and its aftermath during the seventeenth, eighteenth and 
early ninenteenth century are specifically excluded from the lineage from Byzan­
tine art to Cézanne. According to Bell "all that did happen [during this period 
from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth century] was nothing more than a change 
from late manhood to early senility complicated by a house-moving; bringing with 
it new hobbies and occupations. ... A Renaissance picture was meant to say just 
those things that a patron would like to hear. That way lies the end o f art ..." 
(Bell, 1987:162-163). About Rembrandt Bell is willing to concede that he may 
"perhaps [be] the greatest genius of them all", but then one also has to take into 
account that "genius-worship is the infallible sign o f an uncreative age" (ibid.: 
161), and therefore Rembrandt "is a typical ruin of his age. For, except in a few 
o f  his later works, his sense of form and design is utterly lost in a mess of 
rhetoric, romance, and chiaroscuro" (ibid..172).
What does Bell’s lineage o f  significant art seem to say? To his contemporaries 
Bell’s juxtaposition o f Cézanne with Piero della Francesca might have sounded 
odd, if not outrageous. But he is playing an intellectual trick, apparently backed 
up by art historical knowledge. Bell delivers an eloquent apology o f the new and 
unthought o f so far by pointing to the so-called fact that the outrageous has its 
respected but long-forgotten forerunners. Cézanne is portrayed in this defense as 
picking up the golden thread that has been lost for some time. He reinstates the 
good tradition -  o f ‘significant form’. More important, however, is that Bell con­
flates significant form and significant art, the aesthetically significant and the art 
historically significant.
Are we any closer now to the meaning of ‘significant form’? When is a form 
‘significant’? Given Bell’s conflation o f the possible meanings o f significant 
fo rm , the problem is not so much how to recognize form, but how to recognize its 
significance. And when a significant form has been recognized and identified, 
what exactly has been recognized and identified?
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2.1 Two kinds of significance
The close reading of Bell so far seems to suggest that ‘significant form’ implies 
two meanings:
2.1.1 The ‘formal’ qualities of a work of art
The 'formal ’ qualities o f  a work o f  art imply the interplay o f lines, colours, 
shapes, textures, surfaces and spaces. Bell seems to be content with the mere 
observation or awareness that there happens to be this interplay. What exactly is 
effected by this interplay o f ‘formal’ elements, for instance what it ‘says’ or 
‘communicates’ and how it comes about to ‘say’ or ‘communicate’, remains ob­
scure -  even in the account Bell gives o f this effect, viz. the ‘stirring of 
emotions’. However, to recognize these formal elements requires very little from 
the ‘emotions’ as some ‘deeper’ way o f knowing art. Bell’s judgement o f Rem­
brandt and Poussin attests to this: the striking features o f some o f Rembrandt’s 
later works are his ‘sense of form and design’, and on Poussin Bell’s judgement 
even amounts to a prescription:
For instance, in the best works o f  N icolas Poussin, the greatest artist o f  the 
age, you will notice that the hum an figure is treated as a  shape cu t out o f  
coloured paper to be p inned on as the com position directs. T hat is the right 
w ay to treat the hum an figure; the m istake lay in m aking these shapes retain 
the characteristic  gestures o f  C lassical rhetoric’ (ibid.: 173).
‘Significant form’ in this sense refers to the spatial organization o f  shapes in 
coherence with the other qualities o f the artistic material, viz. colour, tone and 
texture. The implied prescription that ‘shapes’ should be unburdened by ‘charac­
teristic gestures o f  Classical rhetoric’ suggests that significant form  means 
visually striking and strong form, constituted by the artistic qualities o f  the 
material the artist employs. ‘Significant’ here does not suggest non-discursive 
meaning which can be rendered lexicographically by approximation. There is no 
‘dictionary’ o f significant form s, only approximate descriptions o f visually stri­
king relations o f  the qualities o f artistic material. Representation is specifically 
excluded from significant form:
[I]f a representative form has value, it is as form, not as representation. The 
representative elem ent in a work o f  art m ay or m ay not be harm ful; alw ays 
it is irrelevant (ibid.:25).
To reiterate: Bell’s concept o f significant form  leads us toward an awareness of 
the use of rudimentary artistic material.
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2.1.2 Art historical sense
There is a second sense in which ‘significant form’ is used, which I shall call the 
art historical sense. A mere descriptive category is not intended by this second 
use, but rather a term which signifies approbation: a quite readily observable 
change or break in style which, according to Bell, is for the better. This break 
appears to be something radically new, but on second (art historical) thoughts it is 
a mere "crest o f a new movement destined and doomed inevitably to sink to 
depths undreamed o f ..." (ibid.: 123). The history o f  art is to be thought o f as a 
succession of declines; each decline is to be likened to a "slope ... which lies 
between a great primitive morning, when men create art because they must, and 
that darkest hour when men confound imitation with art" (ibid.: 122). A quite 
readily observable break in style, when it may lay claim to ‘significance’, is when 
an artist or a movement temporarily reverses the inevitable downward slope to 
recapture something o f the ‘great beginning’. Thus whatever ‘significant form’ 
may be, it is informed by what is regarded, especially by Bell, as the "great 
primitive morning". ‘Significant form’ should at least be compatible with a 
certain body of art historical knowledge, preferably of the Romantic kind which 
Bell espouses.
So the phrase significant form, as Bell employs it, is rather ambivalent. That 
does not necessarily disqualify it, although one must acknowledge that it is not so 
simple to use it as a key to all genuine art as Bell alleges. In a way these two 
senses o f the phrase signi ficant form  may complement one another: The visually 
striking is that which violently disturbs the conventional and boring, canonized 
painterly procedures. An aesthetics o f  significant form  is the theoretical under­
standing and explanation o f one of late modernism’s prime aesthetic phenomena, 
viz. the new. Significant form  as a formalist aesthetic category is parasitic upon a 
body of art historical knowledge, and requires a certain minimum o f comparative 
procedures according to an art historical canon, which in Bell’s case demands 
only and formally a renewal o f what has become superficial through repetition 
and sallow variation. The canon o f significant art is instantiated by a repertoire 
o f works of art accorded that status by the art historical insight o f the art critic. In 
Bell’s aesthetics the other possibility o f the appearance o f the new, viz. negation, 
is not considered, probably because it was not yet experienced as an issue. Nega­
tion would involve not only previous art forms, but ultimately art and its socially 
instituted role itself.
2.2 The significance of form (1)
The question about the grounds for the insight o f the art critic as well as the 
specific repertoire used to back up the notion o f significant form  remains a nag-
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ging issue. To repeat the question: The problem is not so much how to recognize 
form, but how to recognize its significance. Bell’s answer to this is most unsatis­
factory, but, again, very revealing. Bell simply reverts to a long-standing tradition 
that the perception and recognition o f works o f art call for a special, if  not 
elevated, faculty o f the mind, namely the emotions, more specifically the aesthetic 
emotion. Actually, Bell settles this issue en passant as a logical prerequisite for 
his notion o f significant form . I quote at length:
The starting-point for all systems o f aesthetics must be the personal 
experience o f a peculiar emotion. The objects that provoke this emotion we 
call works o f art. All sensitive people agree that there is a peculiar emotion 
provoked by works o f art. ... This emotion is called the aesthetic emotion; 
and if  we can discover some quality common and peculiar to all objects that 
provoke it, we shall have solved what 1 take to be the central problem of 
aesthetics (ibid.:7).
Bell flattens the antinomy o f taste (‘How can something as individual as a 
judgment o f taste ever acquire the status o f universal acquiescence?’) by using an 
ad populum  appeal to ‘all sensitive people’. It is stated that works o f art are 
known through a specific emotion, the aesthetic emotion. Bell does not bother to 
go into the details o f an anatomy o f this emotion, because -  for obvious reasons, 
already stated in the eighteenth century -  it simply cannot be done in a rationally 
convincing manner. Matters o f sentiment, such as the awareness o f beauty, 
cannot be treated with the same rigour as matters o f fact, as Hume told us. But 
Hume showed us a way out. The aesthetic emotion can be identified through its 
observable effects on behaviour; well, almost. When one experiences the 
aesthetic emotion one loses oneself "in that infinitely sublime state o f  mind to 
which pure visual form transports" one (ibid.:31).
Art transports us from the world o f m an’s activity to a world o f aesthetic 
exaltation. For a moment we are shut o ff from human interests; our antici­
pations and memories are arrested; we are lifted above the stream o f life 
(ibid.:25).
The end result o f the "stirring o f the aesthetic emotion" is "aesthetic rapture" 
(ibid.: 18). What happens here is that Bell takes the eighteenth century’s ‘seventh 
sense’, the organ for artistic taste, for granted (cf. Meager, 1955; Osborne 1955), 
and without belabouring the socio-cultural requisites for the proper exercise of 
that organ (as Hume for instance did), masks the inherent elitism o f the modernist 
concept o f taste by giving a metaphysical twist to the functioning o f the aesthetic 
emotion. Taste, as a result o f the aesthetic emotion, is not the exclusive domain 
derived from "an assembly of civilized men -  men like [Hume] him self' (Gay, 
1973:309). Instead o f an autonomy for the sphere o f commerce with the arts 
based on social or class distinctions, Bell opts for autonomy as exclusivity on 
metaphysical grounds (cf. Crowther, 1922; Fishman, 1963).
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The aesthetic mysticism to which Bell’s account of the aesthetic emotion leads is 
an underpinning o f his modernist and formalist approach to cleanse the commerce 
with works o f art from so-called non-aesthetic interests. But it is also at logger­
heads with the implied requisites o f the term significant form  as he implements it 
himself. The art historical knowledge which is supposed to back up the recog­
nition o f (historically) significant form  in a work o f art (as aesthetically signifi­
cant form) has nothing mysterious or mystical about it. It is communicable, it can 
be conceptualized and it allows for comparison, which is clearly not the case with 
‘aesthetic rapture’. Significant form  may, however, be reconciled with an 
irrational aesthetic mysticism if it is taken to be the awareness by way o f the 
aesthetic emotion of the mere formal aspects o f a work o f art, in the first sense 
outlined above (i.e. as aesthetically significant form ). I doubt whether Bell would 
stick to such an ‘empty’ formalism for very long. Significant form  in the sense 
Bell wants to understand it appeals too strongly to a justifiable knowledge o f the 
history o f art to be that esoteric and idiosyncratic. Bell may not quite be aware of 
the impact o f his own reconstruction o f the history of art on the initial exposition 
o f his concept o f significant form . Taken as an apparently inductive conclusion 
from a set o f aesthetic emotional experiences, it seems to underscore the kind of 
formalism Eduard Hanslick espoused: form is in a certain sense its own content, 
it has no significance beyond itself (cf. Ahlberg, 1992:5-20).
Whatever the case may be, Bell’s significant form  is a response to a further issue 
concerning modernist art, i.e. the problem o f the autonomy o f a work o f art. By 
opposing representation with significant form, and thereby somewhat overhastily 
excluding semantic meaning from visual art forms (which then is restored in part 
by the art historical significance o f forms), the independence o f the work o f  art 
from an art market or any immediate social function is, at least temporarily, 
secured. To bolster this autonomy, it is necessary to emphasize the ‘true’ general 
quality o f all works o f art and present it as a generally accessible characteristic o f 
art. But behind this procedure another typically modernist strategy is hiding: 
significant fo rm  is only accessible to the art-historically educated who surrep­
titiously take their aesthetic experience as the standard of all aesthetic experience.
3. Langer’s reinterpretation of significant form
It is on this point that Susanne K. Langer rehabilitates Bell’s concept o f  signi­
fican t form . She underpins it with an epistemology which one may regard as a 
precursor o f postmodernist openness. As she states it herself:
[T]he only stumbling block which has held up the progress o f ... ‘significant 
fo rm  ’ has been, I think, a lack of understanding o f the ways in which logical 
structures may enter into various types o f ‘significance’ (Langer, 1973:218).
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Taking the lead from Bell and at the same time disclaiming his tendency towards 
a ‘purist’ formalism (Langer, 1973:cf. 236-7), she opens up the theoretical scope 
o f sign ificance  by suggesting a variety o f types of significance. At the same time 
the aesthetic experience is relocated: whereas Bell tried to take the late modem 
use o f the ‘ugly’ and the visually disconcerting seriously by focussing on the art- 
historical significance o f form in Cézanne’s paintings by relating them to early 
‘primitivist’ painting, but settling the embarrassing hybrid o f aesthetic 
understanding uncomfortably in the traditional domain o f the gratification of the 
senses, Langer treats significant fo rm  as something which has an inherent logic: 
the ‘logic’ o f analogy, encompassing the senses, the intellect and language, by 
which it acts as a means to conceive of something.
Langer’s reworking of the notion o f significant fo rm  is taken up here exactly for 
this reason: her approach offers wider epistemological scope than does Bell’s. 
Bell neglects the issue of how one comes to know the significance of form. And 
there is no need to enter into a detailed genealogy of Langer’s thoughts to explore 
the viability o f her solution.
Langer’s treatment o f significant fo rm  also points to an awareness o f the qualities 
o f artistic material as a prerequisite for getting acquainted with works of art 
intelligibly. Her argument, however, does not call for a tacit kind o f knowledge 
as is the case with Bell’s art-historically reconstructed repertoire. The argument 
is instantiated by empirical psychological studies on the reception o f musical 
sounds, and sounds convincing within the boundaries o f music. The point then 
remains: how does one talk about significant fo rm  in the other arts? How could 
one generalize a formalist theory o f artistic material in order to be applicable to 
the other arts?
3.1 The significance of form (2)
Let us first consider Langer’s argument for the significance of form in music. 
Relying on the findings of a psychological study of the "many aspects that enter 
into the notion of musical significance ... in ways that fairly well exclude non­
musical factors such as personal associations with tunes, instruments, styles ..., or 
programmatic suggestions" (ibid.:229), the significance of (a) musical sound is 
portrayed as follows: "the lowest stage o f tone-apprehension yields merely an 
impression of tone-co lor  of the whole tonal complex, or o f a difference between 
tone-colors o f the separate tones" (ibid.:229), together with a sense o f the 
duration of intervals between tones experientially "translated" as "width of tonal 
intervals". This lays the foundation for a succession o f meaning constitutive 
perceptions by the listener. As soon as the listener perceives a difference in tonal 
colours, an awareness of "tonal movement" and consequently o f "musical direc­
tion" follows. The joint awareness of tonal distance and direction leads to the
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perception of a "musical step", which is the prerequisite for an anticipation o f the 
following step, or an imagining of the previous step. This manifests itself in a 
sense for "consonance, dissonance and relatedness", i.e. a scale or tonic, which in 
turn "determines the feeling o f modality". Langer concludes:
The entire study shows effectively how many factors o f possible expressive 
virtue are involved in even the simplest musical structure, how many things 
beside the acknowledged materials o f composition have crucial functions in 
conveying a musical message (ibid.:231).
The exact point o f Langer’s analysis is to demonstrate how the perception of 
certain inherent qualities or characteristics o f the musical material is and becomes 
related to analogous perceptions gained from other spheres o f experience, and 
how meaning or sense is imputed in a sublingual fashion from one known per­
ception to another, to make sense out o f the other.
Music articulates forms which language cannot set forth. ... It is just 
because music has noI the same terminology and pattern, that it lends itself 
to the revelation o f non-scientific concepts (ibid.:233).
Given this distinction and limitation, it then makes sense to speak o f "music as a 
semantic of vital and emotional facts" (ibid.:235), "for what music can actually 
reflect is only the morphology of feeling" (ibid.:238).
3.2 "An unconsummated symbol"
This certainly is a big lump to swallow -  especially when Langer refers explicitly 
to Bell:
Therefore music is "Significant fo rm ', in the peculiar sense o f ‘significant’ 
which Mr. Bell and Mr. Fry maintain they can grasp, or feel, but not define; 
such significance is implicit, but not conventionally fixed (ibid.:241).
Perhaps Langer allows herself too much liberty in defining significance if one 
concedes readily the gap which at least Bell has left her. But I would not object 
too much at such a ‘creative misunderstanding’. Implicit in Bell’s use o f the term 
significant form  and in Langer’s exposition o f it is the notion o f ‘reading’ a 
painting or a composition/performance. If Bell’s concept o f significant fo rm  does 
not include an allusion to semantics, it can be maintained that the implicit notion 
o f reading is contained in his version o f significant fo rm  by the activity o f  art 
historical comparison which supports it. Something similar goes for Langer: it is 
the sublingual, subconscious activity of comparing and relating the different 
aspects o f sound which gives rise to it attaining some sense. Langer is careful to 
distinguish artistic meaning from the kind o f meaning Bell disqualified as 
‘descriptive’. Artistic meaning is symbolic meaning which does not invite us to
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to deal with something by evoking an emotional response. Symbolic meaning 
leads us to "insight", to "conceive" of something (ibid.:223). This is best under­
stood when the traditional logical distinction between denotation and connotation 
is also taken into account. A musical form does not denote a specific mood in the 
sense that it is a necessary expression of the mood o f the composer at the time of 
the composition, or a mood of that kind expressed through music and in some 
way recognizable by an audience. Langer maintains that
music has all the earmarks o f a true symbolism, except one: the existence 
o f an assigned connotation. It is a form that is capable o f connotation, and 
the meanings to which it is amenable are articulations o f emotive, vital, 
sentient experiences. But its import is never fixed. [F]or music at its 
highest, though dearly a symbolic form, is an unconsummated symbol. 
Articulation is its life, but not assertion; expressiveness, not expression.
The actual function o f meaning, which calls for permanent contents, is not 
fulfilled; for the assignment of one rather than another possible meaning to 
each form is never explicitly made (ibid.:240).
In order to get the gist o f Langer’s attempt at rehabilitating Bell’s concept o f sig­
nificant form , one should bear in mind the modernist genealogy o f the concept of 
art. If one takes Kant as one o f the major contributors to this concept, one thing 
that one should never ignore is Kant’s insistence on art as a form o f knowledge or 
cognition. From a postmodern standpoint one could read Kant’s notion o f the 
aesthetic idea ( ‘that representation of the imagination which induces much 
thought, yet without the possibility o f any definite thought whatever, ... and which 
language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render com­
pletely intelligible’ [Kant, 1968:417 -  my own translation]) as a built-in safeguard 
to the project o f modernity, viz. the founding of rational knowledge counter­
pointed by an alternative discourse, the domain o f the aesthetic, for the sake of 
human freedom. The sense o f allowing such a domain to exist would be to allow 
for meaning that escapes logical and scientific rigour, and that in itself amounts to 
allowing for an alternative rationality. Langer’s idea o f a work o f art as an un­
consummated symbol lies half-way between Kant’s aesthetic idea and Derrida’s 
idea o f erasure or postponing the closure of interpretation indefinitely. If one 
bears this in mind it is possible to extend Langer’s vindication o f formalism 
through music to other spheres o f art. Music is not the formalist art par excel­
lence because the meaning or content o f the musical form is unfixed and never 
explicit (except, o f course, for musical imitations of bird calls and the like, or for 
so-called programme music). The same is true of poetry and painting. Although 
poets may use words whose meaning can be looked up in a dictionary, the total 
meaning o f the words in a poem is not exactly, if  at all, constituted by lexico­
graphically standardized denotations. The sounds of the words, their adventitious 
qualities, their placement in the verse -  all contribute to the meaning o f the poem. 
A famous example for formalist poetical reading is Theodor Storm’s "Die Stadt":
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Am grauen Strand, am grauen Meer 
Und seitab liegt die Stadt;
Der Nebel drilckt die Dácher schwer,
Und durch die Stille braust das Meer 
Eintónig urn die Stadt.
The meaning o f those first two lines is not contained in the exact denotations of 
the words, but in the unusual placement and inversion o f  abseits. The conven­
tional usage would have been: Und die Stadt liegt abseits. Bringing abseits to a 
more accentuated position in the line and changing it to seitab is to allude sublin­
gually to a sense o f displacedness and abandonment.
4. Conclusion
If one can ‘formalize’ this explanation, it can be said that formalism as an artistic 
and an aesthetic practice is the conveying and conceiving o f meaning through 
non-discursive means. The major hinge o f formalism in this sense is the identifi­
cation o f contrasts and tensions and their resolutions through the exploitation o f a 
constellation o f artistically activated qualities o f what is traditionally understood 
as the artist’s medium, viz. pigments (painting), voluminous matter (sculpture), 
words (literature), sound (music), movement (dance). But formalism can go one 
step further: what has traditionally been taken as the form o f a  work o f  art, e.g. 
the ‘sonnet form’, the ‘sonata form’, still life or landscape painting or portraiture, 
etc., also becomes ‘formalized’ or conventionalized. Its features are generalized, 
and, once established through discursive formulation, reworked in artistic practice 
as a frame o f reference, or a number o f ‘clues’ ‘which induces much thought’ 
exactly in the sense o f the Kantian aesthetic idea, or a horizon o f  expectations for 
its deciphering. When the consciousness o f  form has achieved this stage, it 
changes its function from ‘recipe’ to critical instrument for artist and critic, and 
thereby it paves the way for its own dissolution. This does not mean the end o f 
art, but, at least for the time being, the recycling o f  forms in all its dimensions.
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